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Comments
Can You Hear Me? Will the Diminishing
Scope of ERISA's Anti-Retaliation




In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA)l to protect the retirement benefits of America's
working men and women. 2 ERISA imposes fiduciary responsibilities
upon the administrators of employee retirement plans and establishes
disclosure guidelines so employees receive information about the
funding and vesting provisions of their plans. 3  These guidelines
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University; B.A. English and Secondary Education, 2008, magna cum laude,
SalisburyUniversity. The author would like to thank her parents, George and Nancy
Kinsman, as well as the rest of her family for their endless love, support, and
encouragement.
1. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1974).
2. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, S. REP. No. 93-127,
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4848.
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)-(c).
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safeguard benefits and ensure employees enjoy a financially secure
retirement.4
To protect the retirement rights of employees, Congress made it
unlawful for an employer to interfere or discriminate against an
employee for exercising the rights guaranteed under ERISA.5
Nevertheless, the mishandling of employee retirement plans remains and
employees are frequently denied benefits to which they are entitled.6
Therefore, to detect unlawful employer behavior and provide effective
enforcement of ERISA, Congress made it unlawful for employers to take
adverse employment actions against employees who have "given
information or [have] testified or [are] about to testify in any inquiry or
proceeding relating to [ERISA]." This provision, also known as
ERISA's whistleblower provision, protects employees engaged in legal
proceedings; however, it is unclear whether this provision extends
protection to employees who voice internal workplace complaints to
employers.
Currently, there is a deeply divided split among the circuit courts of
appeals as to whether ERISA's whistleblower provision extends
protection to internal workplace complaints.' On March 7, 2011, the
Supreme Court of the United States denied a petition for writ of certiorari
to determine the exact scope of ERISA's whistleblower provision. 0
With the Supreme Court's recent denial of certiorari, the scope of
ERISA's whistleblower provision will continue to be a current and
developing issue of contention among the circuit courts.
This Comment focuses on the Ninth, Fifth, Fourth, Second, and
Third Circuits' application of ERISA's whistleblower provision to
internal workplace complaints. The decisions rendered by these circuits
afford differing degrees of protection to employees, and the resulting
4. See 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4842; see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 90 (1983) ("ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests
of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.").
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 ("It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine,
suspend, expel, or discriminate against any participant or beneficiary for exercising any
right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan.").
6. See 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4839.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
8. Courts and legal scholars use the anti-retaliation and whistleblower provisions
interchangeably to refer to Section 510 of ERISA. For simplicity, this Comment will
mainly refer to Section 510 as ERISA's whistleblower provision.
9. See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010); Nicolaou
v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005); King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337
F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003); Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., II F.3d 1311 (5th Cir.
1994); Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii., 999 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1993).
10. See Edwards, 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 2011 WL 767661 (U.S.
Mar. 7, 2011) (No. 10-732); see also Edwards, petition for cert. filed, 2010 WL 4914509
(U.S. Nov. 30, 2010) (No. 10-732).
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implications for ERISA whistleblowers are startling." Accordingly, Part
IL.A of this Comment describes the split among the Ninth, Fifth, Second,
and Fourth Circuits. From there, Part II.B explores the petition for
certiorari filed before the Supreme Court of the United States following
the Third Circuit's restrictive view of ERISA's whistleblower provision
in Edwards v. A.H. Cornell.12
Part III of this Comment describes the criteria the five circuit courts
have used in analyzing ERISA's whistleblower provision 3 and focuses
on the importance of affording broad protection under ERISA.
Specifically, Part III.A describes Congress' intent in enacting federal
whistleblower provisions and the necessity of interpreting whistleblower
provisions broadly. From there, Part III.B details the methods of
statutory interpretation the five circuit courts have used in determining
the scope of ERISA's whistleblower provision. Part IV concludes.
II. CURRENT STATE OF ERISA's WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISION
ERISA's whistleblower provision states "[i]t shall be unlawful for
any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate against any
person because he has given information or has testified or is about to
testify in any inquiry or proceeding related to [ERISA]."l 4 Currently, the
Ninth, Fifth, Fourth, Second, and Third Circuits have analyzed the scope
of ERISA's whistleblower provision.'5 Because Congress did not define
the terms "inquiry" and "proceeding,"' 6 the circuit courts have had
considerable difficulty determining the amount of protection ERISA's
whistleblower provision affords employees voicing internal workplace
complaints to management regarding potential violations of ERISA.
Given the differing degrees of protection the circuits afford employees
under this provision, Part A of this section details the manner in which
the Ninth, Fifth, Fourth, and Second Circuits have interpreted the scope
of ERISA's whistleblower provision. From there, Part B explores the
11. See discussion infra Part III.B.
12. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225 (holding ERISA's whistleblower provision does
not protect an employee's unsolicited internal complaints to management).
13. See id. at 222-24 (focusing on the plain meaning of Section 510); Nicolaou, 402
F.3d at 328-30 (focusing on the fair import of the term "inquiry" and comparing the
language of FLSA to ERISA); King, 337 F.3d at 427 (relying on FLSA's whistleblower
provision); Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315 (applying a fact intensive analysis in determining
whether an employee's action fell within the ambit of an "inquiry or proceeding");
Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411 (applying a practical application of ERISA's language and
noting that excluding internal workplace complaints would "discourage the
whistle[]blower before the whistle is blown").
14. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (emphasis added).
15. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 217; Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 325; King, 337 F.3d at 421;
Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1311; Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 408.
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002.
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Third Circuit's interpretation of ERISA's whistleblower provision in
Edwards v. A.H. Cornell, Inc., a case which was recently before the
Supreme Court of the United States on a petition for writ of certiorari,
which the Supreme Court denied.17
A. The Circuit Split
Two interpretations have emerged from the five circuit courts that
have addressed whether ERISA's whistleblower provision protects
employees who voice internal workplace complaints to management for
violations of ERISA.18 The Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit hold
ERISA's whistleblower provision affords protection to internal
workplace complaints, 19 while the Fourth Circuit and Second Circuit
maintain internal workplace complaints are not protected.2 0  Most
recently, the Third Circuit joined the Fourth Circuit and the Second
Circuit's narrow interpretation of ERISA's whistleblower provision.2 1
This section will set forth the decisions from the Ninth, Fifth, Fourth, and
Second Circuits.
1. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to consider the scope of
ERISA's whistleblower provision. In Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, 22a
bank employee alleged she complained to her supervisor about "potential
and/or actual violations by the bank of the reporting and fiduciary
standards of ERISA." 23  After determining ERISA preempted the
17. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 217, cert. denied, 2011 WL 767661 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2011);
see also Edwards, 610 F.3d at 217, petition for cert. filed, 2010 WL 4914509 (U.S. Nov.
30, 2010) (No. 10-732).
18. Cf Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315 (applying a fact intensive analysis and extending
broad interpretation to ERISA's whistleblower provision), and Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at
411 (applying a practical application of ERISA's language and noting that excluding
internal workplace complaints would "discourage the whistle[]blower before the whistle
is blown"), with Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225 (holding ERISA's whistleblower provision
does not protect an employee's unsolicited internal complaints to management);
Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330 ("The proper focus is not on the formality or informality of the
circumstances under which an individual gives information, but rather on whether the
circumstances can fairly be deemed to constitute an 'inquiry."'); and King, 337 F.3d at
428 (limiting the language "inquiry or proceeding" solely to administrative or legal
proceedings and declining to extend the statute's coverage to intra-company complaints).
19. See Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315; Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411.
20. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330; King, 337 F.3d at 428.
21. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225 (holding ERISA's whistleblower provision does
not protect an employee's unsolicited internal complaints to management). See infra Part
1l.B for an in depth exploration of the Third Circuit's analysis.
22. Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 408.
23. Id. at 409. Specifically, the employee maintained her supervisors directed her to
reimburse a former employee from a profit sharing plan for taxes that [she] had 'properly
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employee's claim under Hawaii's Whistle Blowers' Protection Act, the
Ninth Circuit turned to the application of ERISA's whistleblower
provision.24 The court observed ERISA's whistleblower provision "may
be fairly construed to protect a person in [the employee's] position if, in
fact, she was fired because she was protesting a violation of law in
connection with an ERISA plan." 25 The court explained that presenting
the violation to the managers of the retirement plan will usually be an
26
employee's first action.26 Interpreting ERISA's whistleblower provision
to exclude internal workplace complaints, the court noted, would render
the provision futile because it would "discourage the whistle[]blower
before the whistle is blown." 27  By determining that ERISA's
whistleblower provision should protect employees who voice internal
workplace complaints to the managers of an ERISA plan, the Ninth
Circuit afforded the broadest protection of the five circuits to analyze the
scope of ERISA's whistleblower provision.
2. The Fifth Circuit
Following Hashimoto, the Fifth Circuit was the next circuit to
analyze the scope of ERISA's whistleblower provision. In Anderson v.
Electronic Data Systems Corp.,2 8 the Fifth Circuit broadly interpreted
ERISA's whistleblower provision as prohibiting an employer from
taking an adverse employment action against an employee who had
provided information or given testimony involving a violation of
ERISA.29  In Anderson, an employee was asked to commit several
violations of ERISA.3 0  The employee refused to commit the ERISA
violations and reported the incidents to management.3 1 The court
withheld form a lump sum distribution' of his account." Id. at 410. Additionally, the
employee asserted her supervisors instructed her "'to recalculate a former employee's
pension plan benefit and to use final pay, not final average pay' in violation of ERISA
regulations." Id.
24. See id. at 411.
25. Id. ("[ERISA] is clearly meant to protect whistleblowers.").
26. See id. The court also noted an employer may be tempted, from the start, to
discharge an employee who presents the problem to the responsible managers of the
ERISA plan. See id
27. Id.
28. Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1994).
29. See id. at 1315.
30. See id at 1312. Specifically, the employee alleged he was asked to "sign on two
separate occasions approval or payment invoices on behalf of the pension portfolios
under his management and supervision who [sic] had been retained by [another
employee] without approval of the pension trustees." Id. Additionally, the employee was
also asked "to write up minutes for meetings which he did not attend in connection with
[a retirement plan]. Id.
31. See id at 1313.
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determined the employee's action of reporting the incidents to
management fell within the scope of ERISA's whistleblower provision
for preemption purposes. 32 Similar to the Ninth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit
embraced a broad interpretation of an "inquiry or proceeding,"
concluding that merely reporting an ERISA violation falls within the
ambit of ERISA's whistleblower provision.33
3. The Fourth Circuit
In stark contrast to the Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, the
Fourth Circuit limited the language "inquiry or proceeding" solely to
administrative or legal proceedings and declined to extend the statute's
coverage to intra-company complaints. In King v. Marriott
International, Inc., 34 the employee learned her supervisor recommended
the company "transfer millions of dollars from its medical plan into its
general reserve account." 3 5 Believing this transfer would violate ERISA,
the employee expressed concern about the legality of the transfer to her
supervisor and co-workers.3 6 Despite her objections, the employee
learned the company still planned to proceed with the transfer.
Accordingly, the employee once again objected to the transfer, registered
her objection with two in-house attorneys, and requested an opinion
letter from counsel. Thereafter, the employee learned the company
planned to transfer more money out of the medical fund.3 9 After the
employee objected verbally and in writing, the employee's supervisor
terminated her employment.4 0 Relying on its interpretation of a similar
provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 4 1 the Fourth Circuit
held the legislature's use of the phrase "testify or about to testify" limits
an inquiry or proceeding to that which is "legal or administrative."4 2 At
a bare minimum, an employee must do something more "formal" than
make a written or oral complaint to a supervisor.43 The Fourth Circuit's
32. See id. at 1314.
33. Id.
34. King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003).






41. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2011).
42. King, 337 F.3d at 427; see also Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360,
364 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that the term "proceeding" in FLSA does not "sweep so
broadly" to encompass an intra-company complaint).
43. King, 337 F.3d at 427.
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view, therefore, provides for one of the narrowest interpretations of
ERISA's whistleblower provision.44
4. The Second Circuit
Providing a middle ground between the Ninth and Fifth Circuits'
broad view and the Fourth Circuit's narrow view, the Second Circuit
provided a unique interpretation of ERISA's whistleblower provision. In
Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc.,45 the Second Circuit analyzed the
definition of the term "inquiry" as applied in ERISA's statutory language
to determine the scope of ERISA's whistleblower provision.46
Presuming Congress intended ERISA's statutory language to be read
"with its plain meaning," the court determined ERISA's whistleblower
provision extended coverage to an employee who had given information
or participated in an inquiry that related to possible violations of
ERISA.47 Accordingly, the court held ERISA's whistleblower provision
would extend to an employee who met with the president of the
corporation with whom she was employed in order to give information
regarding a serious payroll discrepancy in the corporation's 401(k)
plan.4 8 The court reasoned the term "inquiry" constituted something less
than a formal proceeding.49 The court believed its interpretation should
not focus on the formality or informality of the manner in which an
employee provides information;50 rather, the proper focus is whether an
employee has participated in an "inquiry."si Based upon this reasoning,
44. The court did cite, however, the contrary decisions of the Ninth and Fifth
Circuits. See id The court believed the Fifth Circuit erred in Anderson by merely
reciting the language of ERISA without addressing the "facial inapplicability of
[ERISA's whistleblower provision] to intra-office complaints." Id. The court found the
Ninth Circuit's policy analysis in Hashimoto to be equally problematic, arguing that
ERISA's whistleblower provision could not be "fairly construed" to extend to intra-office
complaints. Id.
45. Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005).
46. See id at 329.
47. Id. ("[ERISA's] protections are extended to 'any person [who has] given
information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to'
possible violations of ERISA.").
48. See id. at 330. Here, the employee initially met with in-house counsel regarding
the 401(k) plan discrepancy. Id. The pair proceeded to report the finding to the president
of the corporation, and the employee "promised to remain available to assist or provide
additional information in connection with the investigation." Id The employee was
subsequently terminated. Id. at 327.
49. Id. at 330.
50. Id. ("The proper focus is not on the formality or informality of the circumstances
under which an individual gives information, but rather on whether the circumstances can
fairly be deemed to constitute an 'inquiry.').
5 1. See id. Here, the court believed its decision was in accordance with the Fourth
Circuit's decision in King, to the extent that ERISA's whistleblower provision
encompasses "something more formal than written or oral complaints made to a
6912011]
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the Second Circuit developed a unique analysis under ERISA's
whistleblower provision that seems to yield results similar to the Fourth
Circuit.52
B. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit is the most recent circuit to analyze the scope of
ERISA's whistleblower provision. In Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son,
Inc.," the Third Circuit joined the Second and Fourth Circuit's narrow
interpretation, holding ERISA's whistleblower provision does not protect
an employee's unsolicited internal complaints to management. 54  This
section tracks the progression of Edwards, beginning with the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania's analysis and concluding with the petition for
writ of certiorari filed with the Supreme Court of the United States.
1. Eastern District of Pennsylvania
In March of 2006, Defendant A.H. Cornell hired plaintiff Shirley
56Edwards to create a human resources department at its company.
During her employment with A.H. Cornell, Edwards asserted she learned
the company was "engaging in unlawful acts."5 Specifically, Edwards
maintained A.H. Cornell committed numerous ERISA violations,
including: (1) "administering [its] group health plan on a discriminatory
basis;" (2) "misrepresenting to some employees the cost of group health
coverage in an effort to dissuade employees from opting into benefits;"
and (3) "enrolling non-citizens in its ERISA plans by providing false
social security numbers and other fraudulent information to insurance
carriers."5 In response, Edwards "'objected to and/or complained to'
supervisor." Id. However, the court disagreed the phrase "testify or about to testify"
controls the analysis. Id
52. See id at 331 (Pooler, J., concurring). Judge Pooler echoed the Ninth Circuit's
policy-based concerns in Hashimoto, arguing limiting ERISA's whistleblower provision
to "formal, external inquir[ies] would seem to leave a prudent fiduciary with nothing but
unattractive options when she discovers possible breaches of duty." Id
53. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010).
54. Id. at 218.
55. See First Am. Comp. at 13, Edwards, 2009 WL 2215074 (E.D. Pa. July 23,
2009) (No. 09-CV-1 184).
56. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 218. A.H. Cornell is a family run company that
"engages in the business of performing contracting and construction services, such as
excavation, paving, snow removal, recycling, and other commercial and residential
construction projects." First Am. Comp. at $ 7, Edwards, 2009 WL 2215074 (E.D. Pa.
July 23, 2009) (No. 09-CV-1184). A.H. Cornell consists of approximately 55-65
employees. Id at 12.
57. Edwards, 2009 WL 2215074 at *1.
58. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 219.
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A.H. Cornell's management about these ERISA violations." 59 Defendant
terminated Edwards' employment shortly thereafter. 6 0
After adopting the Second Circuit's analysis in Nicolaou,61 the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted A.H. Cornell's motion to
62dismiss Edwards' complaint. Because Edwards did not allege anyone
"requested information from her" or "initiated contact with her," and
because she did not allege she was involved "in any type of formal or
informal gathering of information," the court found her actions did not
fall within the meaning of an "inquiry."63 Accordingly, the court held an
employee's objection or complaint to management regarding an
employer's alleged ERISA violation does not constitute an inquiry or
proceeding.64
2. Appeal to the Third Circuit
Edwards filed a timely appeal to the Third Circuit. In support of her
argument that the Third Circuit should interpret ERISA's whistleblower
provision as protecting employees who voice internal workplace
complaints, Edwards maintained ERISA's whistleblower provision
should be read synonymously with FLSA's whistleblower provision.6 5
Edwards pointed out most courts find that FLSA's whistleblower
provision, which is similar to ERISA's, is "remedial legislation which is
to be liberally construed." 66 Edwards acknowledged the Third Circuit
has not ruled as to whether FLSA protects an employee who makes an
informal complaint to an employer; however, she argued the Third
Circuit "has noted approvingly that 'it has been applied to protect
employees who have protested [FLSA] violations to their employers."' 6 7
Finally, Edwards argued a ruling that ERISA's whistleblower provision
59. Id. (internal citation omitted).
60. See First Am. Comp. at 30, Edwards, 2009 WL 2215074 (E.D. Pa. July 23,
2009) (No. 09-CV-1184). Specifically, Edwards alleged she "'was directed to commit
and/or to participate' in the fraud in close proximity to her termination, which was on
February 11, 2009." Id. at 16, 30.
61. See Edwards, 2009 WL 2215074 at *4 ("Upon consideration of the statutory
language in the relevant provision, this Court finds the Second Circuit's analysis in
Nicolaou to be persuasive. Thus, we agree that the proper inquiry is whether the
Plaintiffs alleged objections and complaints to management in the present case were
given as part of an inquiry.").
62. See id. at *5.
63. See id.
64. See id
65. See Brief for Appellant at 10, Edwards, 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-
3198).
66. Id at 11.
67. Id. at 10 (citing Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 124 (3d Cir. 1987)); see also
discussion infra Part III.B.2.c.
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does not protect an employee's internal workplace complaint "would
invalidate the anti-retaliation provision of ERISA. .. ."68
Additionally, the Secretary of Labor, who is charged with ERISA's
administration,69 filed a brief in support of Edwards as amicus curiae. In
her brief, the Secretary argued ERISA's whistleblower provision "should
be read broadly to effectuate the remedial purposes of ERISA and the
intent of Congress in drafting section 510-protecting whistleblowers
and securing the promises and benefits of ERISA."70 The Secretary
maintained protecting unsolicited complaints and objections to
management, regardless of the level of formality, "satisfies
Congressional intent and enables the proper and efficient functioning of
ERISA's enforcement scheme, which relies on complaints by individuals
to protect the substantive rights provided under ERISA."n
In response to plaintiffs arguments, defendant A.H. Cornell argued
ERISA's statutory language "is clear" as to what rises to the level of
72protected activity. The terms "inquiry" and "proceeding," defendant
stated, "denote a [ ] definable event-not every employee gripe."
Believing any other interpretation of ERISA's whistleblower provision
runs "counter" to its statutory language, defendant maintained ERISA's
whistleblower provision "must be interpreted as written" to "avoid a
flood of litigation." 74 In support of its position, defendant surmised "[i]f
an employee is going to deputize herself as a mini Secretary of Labor to
68. See Brief for Appellant at 14. Additionally, Edwards argued any other holding
"would permit an employer to terminate an employee upon the employee first notifying
the employer of the ERISA violation-so long as the employer refuses to investigate the
complaint or ask any follow-up questions to the [sic] determine the authenticity of the
complaint." Id. at 14-15.
69. See Brief for Sec'y of Labor at 1, Edwards, 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-
3198); see also 29. U.S.C. § 1001.
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 6. In furtherance of its argument, the Secretary of Labor noted:
Whether construed as giving information in a proceeding or inquiry, part of an
inquiry, constituting the first step of an inquiry, or exercising rights under
ERISA, an employee's unsolicited, internal complaints and objections are
protected under section 510... . This Circuit has interpreted the anti-retaliation
provisions of other remedial statutes such as the Fair Labor Standard Act and
the Clean Water Act-provisions that, on their face, are written more narrowly
than section 510-in accordance with their purposes, to protect employees
from retaliation for voicing complaints to management. Given the remedial
purpose of ERISA and section 510's broad language, this Court-like the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits-should likewise interpret section 510 to protect from
retaliation persons making unsolicited ERISA-related complaints and
objections to management.
Id at 5-6.
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ensure ERISA compliance by her employer, at a minimum, she can be
expected to properly lodge her complaint.""
3. Third Circuit: Majority Opinion
Noting it was presented with an issue of first impression, the Third
Circuit proceeded to determine "whether the anti-retaliation provision of
Section 510 of ERISA . . . protects an employee's unsolicited internal
complaints to management."7 The Third Circuit began its analysis with
an examination of the language of ERISA's whistleblower provision.7 7
Finding the language "to be clear,"78 the court proceeded to discern
whether Edwards gave information as part of an "inquiry." 79 Explaining
Edwards made her complaint to management "voluntarily" and "of her
own accord," the court concluded Edwards' complaints were not
inquiries; rather, they were "statements regarding potential ERISA
violations, not questions seeking information."80 Furthermore, because
ERISA's whistleblower provision "protects employees that have 'given
information,' not employees that have 'received information,' a plain
reading of the provision indicates that 'inquiry' includes only inquiries
made of an employee, not inquiries made by an employee."81
In addition to finding Edwards' actions did not constitute an
inquiry, the court determined Edwards' conduct did not rise to the level
of a proceeding. The court held Edwards' complaint to management did
not meet the necessary level of "formal action" required to constitute a
proceeding; however, the court declined to elaborate on "the level of
formality required for protection." 82 Although the court did not define
the requisite level for protection, the court noted ERISA's whistleblower
provision would protect "information given in legal and administrative
proceedings."
In holding Edwards' complaints to management did not fall within
the ambit of an inquiry or proceeding, the Third Circuit followed the
75. Id.
76. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 218.
77. See id. at 222.
78. Id. at 224. If Section 510 were ambiguous, the court noted, "we would construe
the provision in favor of plan participants." Id. Although the court states, "as discussed
above, we find the provision's plain meaning to be clear," it provides no analysis for its
conclusion that Section 510 is unambiguous. Id
79. Id. at 223.
80. Id.
81. Id. ("The fact that Edwards's complaints may have eventually 'culminat[ed] in
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Fourth Circuit's reasoning in King.84  The Third Circuit found the
language "testified or is about to testify" in Section 510 implies the
phrase "inquiry or proceeding" is limited to "more formal actions."
Because Congress did not employ broad language in drafting ERISA's
whistleblower provision, the court determined it was appropriate to limit
the scope of protection afforded to whistleblowers. 86
4. Third Circuit-Dissent
Judge Cowen dissented from the majority's restrictive application of
ERISA's whistleblower provision. While he agreed the first step in
determining the scope of ERISA's whistleblower provision is to look to
the actual language of Section 510, he disagreed that ERISA's statutory
language is unambiguous.8 7  He suggested it was "highly doubtful"
Congress would have "[left] totally unprotected a certain category of
conduct that this remedial statutory provision was enacted to protect in
the first place." 88  Finally, Judge Cowen noted previous Third Circuit
decisions applied a broad interpretation to similar federal whistleblower
provisions.
5. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Following the Third Circuit's ruling that ERISA's whistleblower
provision does not protect an employee's unsolicited internal complaints
to management, Edwards filed a motion for panel rehearing and en banc
rehearing, which the Third Circuit denied. 90 On November 30, 2010,
Edwards filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States.9' Edwards framed her question presented to the Supreme
Court as follows: "Does the anti-retaliation provision of [ERISA] permit
84. Id at 223. The court declined to adopt the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit or the
Ninth Circuit. The court found the Fifth Circuit "gave the issue cursory treatment," while




87. Id at 226 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
88. Id. Moreover, Judge Cowen noted "Congress viewed this section as a crucial
part of ERISA because, without it, employers would be able to circumvent the provision
of promised benefits." Id (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143
(1990)).
89. See id. at 228-30 (discussing Third Circuit's previous application of the
whistleblower provisions in FLSA and the Clean Water Act).
90. See Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, Edwards 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010)
(No. 09-3198) (July 8, 2010 docket entry).
91. See Edwards, petition for cert. filed, 2010 WL 4914509 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2010)
(No. 10-732).
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an employer to discharge an employee for making unsolicited internal
complaints regarding violations of the statute?" 92  In support of her
petition, Edwards argued the circuit courts "are deeply divided" over the
application of ERISA's whistleblower provision when employees make
unsolicited complaints to management. 93  Moreover, with the sheer
number of individuals who have a pension and benefit plan governed by
ERISA, the scope of ERISA's whistleblower provision is frequently
litigated at the district court level.94 On March 7, 2011, the Supreme
Court denied Edwards' petition for writ of certiorari.95
III. THE FUTURE OF ERISA's WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISION
As detailed in Part II of this Comment, the five circuit courts that
have analyzed ERISA's whistleblower provision are divided as to
whether ERISA extends protection to employees who voice internal
workplace complaints. Undoubtedly, Congress's failure to define the
terms "inquiry" and "proceeding" 96 and the numerous methods of
statutory interpretation available have accounted for the inconsistent
decisions among the circuits.97 The inability of the courts to achieve
uniform interpretation of ERISA's whistleblower provision puts
employees in a precarious position. Without consistent interpretation,
effective enforcement of ERISA will never be achieved.
In light of the current circuit split over the scope of ERISA's
whistleblower provision and the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in
Edwards, this section argues courts should construe ERISA's
whistleblower provision broadly. Accordingly, Part A highlights the
92. Edwards, 2010 WL 4914509 at *i.
93. Id at *7.
94. See id. at *14-15 ("[ERISA] applies to pension and benefit plans that cover over
150 million people. Eighty-six million actively participate in ERISA pension plans and
almost seventy percent of Americans who have health insurance receive it through an
ERISA-governed plan.").
95. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 217; cert. denied, 2011 WL 767661 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2011).
96. See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1974).
97. Cf Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1994)
(applying a fact intensive analysis and extending broad interpretation to ERISA's
whistleblower provision), and Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir.
1993) (applying a practical application of ERISA's language and noting that excluding
internal workplace complaints would "discourage the whistle[]blower before the whistle
is blown"), with Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225 (holding ERISA's whistleblower provision
does not protect an employee's unsolicited internal complaints to management); Nicolaou
v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 330 (2d Cir. 2005) ("The proper focus is not on the
formality or informality of the circumstances under which an individual gives
information, but rather on whether the circumstances can fairly be deemed to constitute
an 'inquiry."'); and King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2003)
(limiting the language "inquiry or proceeding" solely to administrative or legal
proceedings and declining to extend the statute's coverage to intra-company complaints).
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policy reasons for broadening the scope of federal whistleblower
provisions. From there, Part B of this section details the different
methods of statutory interpretation the Ninth, Fifth, Fourth, Second, and
Third Circuits have employed to determine the scope of ERISA's
whistleblower provision98 with an analysis of the degree of protection
each interpretation affords whistleblowers.
A. Importance of Affording Broad Protection Under ERISA
In enacting federal whistleblower provisions, Congress intended to
rely upon information and complaints gathered from employees to
effectuate the broader purposes of the federal statute at issue.99
However, the risks attached to bringing forth a violation of a federal
statute are numerous. 00 While it is the public and other employees who
reap the benefits sown by the whistleblower, there are dire consequences
for the courageous act of blowing the whistle.10 First, the security of a
whistleblower's job is at risk for voicing statutory violations.1 0 2 Second,
should a whistleblower suffer an adverse employment decision as a result
of blowing the whistle, he or she must fund the costs of litigating in
court. This decision will inevitably cause the whistleblower to endure
several years litigating in court with little guarantee of success. 103 If
justice is not served in court, then the whistleblower is left with few
places to turn because many organizations are hesitant to employ a
former whistleblower.10 4  Now the jaded whistleblower's job is long
98. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 222-24 (focusing on the plain meaning of Section
510); Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 328-30 (focusing on the fair import of the term "inquiry" and
comparing the language of FLSA to ERISA); King, 337 F.3d at 427 (relying on FLSA's
whistleblower provision); Anderson, II F.3d at 1315 (applying a fact intensive analysis
in determining whether an employee's action fell within the ambit of an "inquiry or
proceeding"); Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411 (applying a practical application of ERISA's
language and noting that excluding internal workplace complaints would "discourage the
whistle[]blower before the whistle is blown").
99. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) ("For
weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not seek to secure compliance with
prescribed [FLSA] standards through continuing detailed federal supervision or
inspection of payrolls. Rather it chose to rely on information and complaints received
from employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied.").
100. See id at 293.
101. See id ("Faced with such alternatives, employees understandably might decide
that matters had best be left as they are.").
102. See C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL
POWER 19 (Cornell University Press 2001).
103. See id. (arguing that whistleblowers who litigate their cases often suffer from
depression and alcoholism, have lost their houses and families, and have gone bankrupt).
104. See id at 20 (citing MYRON PERETz GLAZIER AND PENINA MIGDAL GLAZIER, THE
WHISTLEBLOWERS 228 (Basic Books 1989) ("Nobody wants to hire former
whistleblowers. They are all afraid of what we would do if we were asked to tell the
truth about some problem.")).
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gone, there is a dismal chance of finding future employment, and the
once courageous whistleblower has most likely lost all faith in America's
justice system. As one whistleblower stated, "[i]f I had to do it over
again, I wouldn't blow the whistle for a million dollars. It ruined my
life."105 Are these the results Congress had in mind?
With these dire consequences attached to blowing the whistle, it is
imperative that federal whistleblower provisions offer protection to the
few individuals willing to report workplace violations to the appropriate
authority. The societal benefits in obtaining information from
whistleblowers are obvious; yet, there appears to be a stark disconnect
between Congress' intention in enacting whistleblower provisions and
the protection these provisions afford. ERISA's inability to afford
whistleblowers uniform protection for voicing internal workplace
complaints, as evidenced by the varied interpretations from the circuit
courts, highlights this dichotomy.' 06 Accordingly, it is imperative courts
are cognizant of these risks when analyzing the scope of ERISA's
whistleblower provision.
B. Statutory Interpretation ofERISA's Whistleblower Provision
While two interpretations have emerged from the deepening circuit
split surrounding the scope of ERISA's whistleblower provision, the
individual analyses from the five circuit courts differ drastically. The
five circuit courts that have interpreted ERISA's whistleblower provision
have relied upon three methods of interpretation, including: (1) the fair
import of the terms "inquiry" and "proceeding;" 0 7 (2) the synonymous
statutory construction and interpretation of FLSA;'0 and (3) the policy
ramifications of construing ERISA's whistleblower provision too
105. Id at 1.
106. Cf Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1994)
(applying a fact intensive analysis and extending broad interpretation to ERISA's
whistleblower provision), and Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir.
1993) (applying a practical application of ERISA's language and noting that excluding
internal workplace complaints would "discourage the whistle[]blower before the whistle
is blown"), with Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225 (holding ERISA's whistleblower provision
does not protect an employee's unsolicited internal complaints to management); Nicolaou
v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 330 (2d Cir. 2005) ("The proper focus is not on the
formality or informality of the circumstances under which an individual gives
information, but rather on whether the circumstances can fairly be deemed to constitute
an 'inquiry."'); and King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2003)
(limiting the language "inquiry or proceeding" solely to administrative or legal
proceedings and declining to extend the statute's coverage to intra-company complaints).
107. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 222-24; Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 328-30.
108. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 328-30; King, 337 F.3d at 427.
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broadly or too narrowly.1 09  This section considers each method of
statutory construction mechanism in turn.
1. Fair Import Analysis
A fair import analysis, also known as a formalist approach to
statutory interpretation, seeks to derive statutory meaning purely through
a dictionary definition of the terms at issue."10 The Second Circuit and
the Third Circuit employed a formalist approach in an attempt to discern
meaning from the terms "inquiry" and "proceeding" contained in
ERISA's whistleblower provision."' In Nicolaou, the Second Circuit
concluded the term "proceeding" means "the progression of a lawsuit or
other business before a court, agency, or other official body,""12 while an
"inquiry" refers "broadly to any request for information." 1 3 Likewise, in
Edwards, the Third Circuit concluded the term "proceeding" means
"'[t]he regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit' or the 'procedural
means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency,"" 1 4 while an
"inquiry" is defined as "[a] request for information."'' 5
At first glance, the Second Circuit seems to employ a broad
application of ERISA's whistleblower provision; however, its decision
does not extend full protection to future ERISA whistleblowers. 116
109. See Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315; Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411.
110. See R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme
Court and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 25 PEPP. L. REv. 37,
48 (1997).
A formalist prefers clear, bright-line rules. Because inquiry into the in-fact
intent of a legislature can be a messy proposition, a formalist judge is likely to
be tempted to dispense with original intent in favor of asking merely what the
statute's words mean. Determining the meaning of a statute's words can be
done in a more mechanical fashion. Thus, the classic formalist line is perhaps
best stated by the maxim that the court is not to determine legislative intent, but
rather to interpret solely what the statute's words mean. In making this
determination, most formalist judges will resort not only to dictionary
definitions of words, but also to grammatical maxims of construction to help
determine what the words mean.
Id. at 48-49.
111. Additionally, the Second Circuit looked to FLSA for assistance in determining
the scope of ERISA's whistleblower provision. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.a.
112. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 329; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1241 (8th ed.
2004).
113. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 329; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 808 (8th ed.
2004).
114. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1324 (9th Ed. 2009)).
115. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (9th Ed.
2009)).
116. Cf Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330 (extending the coverage of ERISA's
whistleblower provision to an employee who met with in-house counsel and the company
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Under the Second Circuit's analysis, ERISA's whistleblower provision
would protect an employee who met with the president of a company to
give information about a violation of ERISA."' While such a meeting
does not fall under the ambit of a "proceeding," the fair import of the
term "inquiry" would extend coverage to such an employee." In
contrast, however, the Second Circuit's analysis would fail to protect a
whistleblower that merely brought a potential violation of ERISA to a
supervisor because this would not rise to the level of the dictionary
definition of an "inquiry."
Similar to the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit's treatment of the
terms "proceeding" and "inquiry" narrow the scope of ERISA's
whistleblower provision. The Third Circuit restricts the term "inquiry"
to only inquires "made of an employee, not inquires made by an
employee."" 9 Accordingly, a manager or supervisor must approach an
employee for information regarding an ERISA violation.12 0
Additionally, the Third Circuit declined to determine "the level of
formality" required to meet the definition of a proceeding.'21
The Second and Third Circuit's analyses of ERISA's whistleblower
provision ignore Congress' intent in enacting whistleblower provisions
and frustrate the whistleblower process in general. If employees are left
unprotected for initially bringing a violation of ERISA to the attention of
the appropriate authority, then employees will be discouraged from
initiating the first step in the whistleblower process.122 The Second and
Third Circuit's holdings require individuals with the ability to make
employment or legal decisions within the company to first seek out the
would-be whistleblower for information. Thus, an employee must be
approached by an official within the company for his or her actions to
fall under the ambit of an "inquiry" within ERISA's whistleblower
president regarding a violation of ERISA), with King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421,
428 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding that ERISA's whistleblower provision only covers
activities more formal than a written or oral complaint to a supervisor).
117. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330 (extending the coverage of ERISA's
whistleblower provision to an employee who met with in-house counsel and the company
president regarding a violation of ERISA).
118. See id (holding that a meeting with the company president constituted
"something less than a formal proceeding, but . .. sufficient to constitute an "inquiry"
within the meaning of [ERISA's whistleblower provision]."). It appears the Second
Circuit's decision in Nicolaou is limited to the facts of the case. Had the employee not
met with in-house counsel, it is doubtful the employee's actions would have risen to the
level of an inquiry.
119. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223 (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Id n.7.
122. See Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he
anticipatory discharge discourages the whistle[]blower before the whistle is blown.").
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provision. Accordingly, the formalist approach fails to provide
protection to an employee who initially voices an internal workplace
complaint.
2. Synonymous Statutory Interpretation: ERISA and FLSA
Like ERISA, FLSA contains a whistleblower provision protecting
employees against workplace retaliation.12 3  The Fourth Circuit and
Second Circuit have included in their statutory interpretation of ERISA's
whistleblower provision an analysis of FLSA, while the Third Circuit
declined to draw such an analogy. 124  FLSA regulates the maximum
number of hours an employee may work, overtime compensation, and
employee wages. 12 5
Although FLSA's and ERISA's whistleblower provisions are
similar, there are two important differences. between the whistleblower
provisions of ERISA and FLSA. First, FLSA extends coverage to
employees who have "filed any complaint,"1 26  while ERISA's
whistleblower provision includes the language "given information."l 2 7
Second, FLSA only extends coverage to employees who have testified or
who are about to testify in any proceeding, while ERISA protects
employees who have testified or who are about to testify in any inquiry
or proceeding.'28 As explained, infra, the circuit courts disagree as to
which statute affords more protection to whistleblowers.
a. Second Circuit
Prior to examining ERISA's whistleblower provision in Nicoloau,
the Second Circuit analyzed the scope of FLSA's whistleblower
provision in Lambert v. Genesse Hospital.12 9 There, the court held the
plain language of FLSA's whistleblower provision is limited to the filing
123. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (stating, in part, that it shall be unlawful to discharge
or discriminate against an employee "because such employee has filed any complaint or
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has
testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding.").
124. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225 ("[T]he conclusion that internal complaints are
protected under the FLSA does not require a parallel conclusion under ERISA's distinct
statutory language.").
125. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § § 207-208 (2011).
126. Id.
127. See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1974).
128. Cf 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3) (containing the statutory language "testified or is
about to testify in any such proceeding"), with 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (containing the statutory
language "testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding").
129. Lambert v. Genesse Hosp., 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993), abrogated by Kasten v.
Gobain Perf. Plastics Corp., 2011 WL 977061, No. 09-834 (March 22, 2011).
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of formal complaints. 130 After noting its decision strayed from the other
circuits that have considered FLSA's provision, the court declined to
extend the coverage of FLSA to informal workplace complaints.'3 1
Over a decade later, the Second Circuit proceeded to interpret the
differences in statutory language between FLSA and ERISA's
whistleblower provisions in Nicolaou.'32 In that decision, the court drew
several distinctions between the statutory constructions of the two
statutes.' 3 3 The court concluded the term "inquiry" is much less formal
than the term "proceeding." 34 Because FLSA's whistleblower provision
does not contain the term "inquiry," the court reasoned Congress
intended to afford more protection under ERISA's whistleblower
provision than under FLSA's.'35 Thus, according to the Second Circuit,
ERISA's scope of protection is much broader than that of FLSA and
should afford more protection to whistleblowers.136
b. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit also relied upon its interpretation of FLSA's
whistleblower provision to interpret ERISA. In Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-
Q Co.,1 37 the Fourth Circuit found Congress' use of the term
"proceeding" in FLSA encompassed procedures within a judicial or
administrative tribunal.'38 Thus, the court surmised, Congress intended
FLSA's whistleblower provision to encompass adverse employment
actions taken against an employee after formal proceedings began, but
not complaints made to a supervisor for a violation of FLSA.139  The
Fourth Circuit's analysis in Ball became essential to its interpretation of
ERISA's whistleblower provision three years later in King, where the
court limited the scope of ERISA's whistleblower provision to activities
that were "legal or administrative."l 4 0 Instead of focusing on the
differences between FLSA and ERISA, the court reasoned both
provisions were "much narrower" than Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
130. See id. at 55.
131. See id.
132. See Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 329 (2d Cir. 2005).
133. See id. at 328-29.
134. Id. at 329.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. Ball v. Memphis Bar B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2000).
138. See id. at 364 (reasoning that "proceeding" in FLSA's language "refers to
procedures conducted in judicial or administrative tribunals").
139. Id.
140. See King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc. 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003).
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of 1964's whistleblower provision; 14 1 thus, FLSA and ERISA deserved a
"'much more circumscribed' remedy."l4 2
c. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit declined to utilize its treatment of FLSA's
whistleblower provision in Brock v. Richardsonl43 to analyze the scope
of ERISA's text. In Brock, the Third Circuit held FLSA's whistleblower
provision afforded protection to an employee who participated in an
investigation with a compliance officer working for the Department of
Labor.14 4 Although the court did not determine whether FLSA protects
internal complaints, it cited to that broad approach with approval in
dicta.145 The Third Circuit distinguished its decision in Brock, stating "it
concerned a different issue in the context of a different statute." 46 The
court noted the whistleblower provisions of ERISA and FLSA "are not
identical." 4 7 Rather, FLSA's whistleblower provision "extends broadly
to persons that have 'filed any complaint' without explicitly stating the
141. See id. ("The anti-retaliation provision in [ERISA] is much narrower than the
equivalent anti-retaliation provisions in such statutes as Title VIl of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.").
142. See id (citing Ball, 228 F.3d at 364).
143. Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1987).
144. See id. at 125. In Brock, the employee signed a written statement with the
compliance officer which placed his employer's alleged violations in writing. See id. at
122. The court's analysis did not focus on whether the employee's actions of signing a
written statement with the compliance officer constituted a "proceeding" under FLSA;
rather, the court focused on the employer's subjective state of mind. See id. at 125. The
court concluded that because the employer believed the employee had filed a formal
complaint with the Wage and Hour Division, the employee was covered by FLSA's
whistleblower provision. See id. While the Third Circuit did not analyze the scope of the
term "proceeding" under FLSA's whistleblower provision in Brock, the court noted that
creating a barrier between employees and officials would amount to ineffective
enforcement of FLSA's provisions and diminish the statute's purpose. See id at 124.
Rather, employees should have unfettered access to voice their grievances to officials.
See id (citing Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)
("[Congress] chose to rely on information and complaints received from employees
seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied. Plainly, effective enforcement
could thus only be excepted if employees felt free to approach officials with their
grievances.")). The court cited a line of cases from other circuits, noting that courts have
looked to FLSA's purpose and have extended coverage to activities that otherwise would
not be covered. See Brock, 812 F.2d at 124. The court explained that FLSA's anti-
retaliation provision has been extended to instances in which the employee's activities
"were considered necessary to the effective assertion of employees' rights under the
[FLSA], and thus entitled to protection". Id. The court also stated that FLSA's language
has been applied for the purpose of protecting employees who have protested an
employer's violation of FLSA. See id.
145. See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d 217, 224 n.8 (3d. Cir. 2010).
146. Id. at 224.
147. Id.
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level of formality required."1 4 8  Therefore, the court noted, "the
conclusion that internal complaints are protected under [ ] FLSA does
not require a parallel conclusion under ERISA's distinct statutory
language."1 49
d. FLSA and ERISA-Confusion Across the Circuits
While FLSA's whistleblower provision is similar to ERISA's, there
are important differences deserving attention. 50 Congress included the
additional term "inquiry" within ERISA's whistleblower provision, and,
as the Second Circuit noted, this is indicative of Congress' intention to
provide more protection under ERISA.' 5' Additionally, three circuit
courts have construed the scope of protection afforded between the two
statutes differently. For example, in Nicolaou, the Second Circuit
maintained ERISA's whistleblower provision is broader than FLSA's,15 2
while, in Edwards, the Third Circuit found FLSA is broader than
ERISA.'5 3 To the contrary, in King, the Fourth Circuit applied the same
interpretation to both ERISA and FLSA.154  Adding to the confusion,
even though both the Second Circuit and the Fourth Circuit relied upon
their decisions in interpreting FLSA to define the scope of ERISA's
whistleblower provision, the circuits differed in their analyses and
outcomes.155
On March 22, 2011, the Supreme Court held in Kasten v. Saint-
Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.156 that FLSA's whistleblower
148. Id.
149. Id. at 225. In his dissent, Judge Cowen criticized the majority's discussion of
FLSA. See id at 230-31 (Cowen, J., dissenting). While agreeing FLSA differs from
ERISA, Judge Cowen argued "the differences here actually weigh against the
interpretation offered by the majority." Id. at 230.
150. Cf 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3) (containing the statutory language "testified or is
about to testify in any such proceeding"), with 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (containing the statutory
language "testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding").
151. See Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 328-29 (2d Cir. 2005)
(noting that the informality of the term "inquiry" is indicative of Congress's intent to
construe ERISA broadly).
152. See id. at 328 ("Section 510 ... is unambiguously broader in scope that Section
15(a)(3) of FLSA.").
153. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 224-25 (noting that FLSA's whistleblower provision
"extends broadly to persons that have 'filed any complaint,' without explicitly stating the
level of formality required" while ERISA's whistleblower provision, "in contrast, extends
only to persons that have 'given information or [ ] testified' in an 'inquiry or
proceeding."').
154. See King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003).
155. Cf id. (holding that ERISA's whistleblower provision merely encompasses
activities that are "legal or administrative"), with Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 329 (noting that
ERISA's whistleblower provision is much broader than that of FLSA.).
156. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perf. Plastics Corp., 2011 WL 977061, No. 09-834
(March 22, 2011).
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provision protects oral as well as written complaints. 57 As noted, supra,
however, the circuits differ in their analyses of FLSA and ERISA's
whistleblower provision. Given the difference in protection the Second
Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have afforded whistleblowers under
ERISA after analyzing FLSA's whistleblower provision, and the Third
Circuit's decision not to draw an analogous interpretation to FLSA, it is
unclear whether the Supreme Court's decision in Kasten will provide
guidance to the circuits' in the future.
3. Policy Interpretation of ERISA
Of the five circuit courts to interpret ERISA's whistleblower
provision, only one court has relied entirely upon a policy interpretation
to define its scope. In Hashimoto, the Ninth Circuit looked to the
purpose and process of ERISA's whistleblower provision to define its
scope.1ss The court believed construing ERISA's whistleblower
provision too narrowly would lead to illogical results.15 9 Moreover, the
Fifth Circuit's interpretation of ERISA's whistleblower provision in
Anderson mirrors the result of the Ninth Circuit.' 6 0 Unfortunately, the
analysis in Anderson is sparse; however, it appears the court also
intended to interpret this section of ERISA broadly.16'
Looking to the substance of ERISA's whistleblower provision, if
the term "inquiry" is not interpreted to include employers who bring
violations of ERISA to the attention of a supervisor, then the purpose of
ERISA's whistleblower provision is thwarted. While courts agree
employees giving information in legal proceedings are protected from
employer retaliation, the failure to extend protection to employees who
voice internal workplace complaints ignores the logical progression of
157. Id at *2.
158. See Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth
Circuit's policy interpretation in Hasimoto is also consistent with its interpretation of
FLSA's whistleblower provision six years later. In Lambert v. Ackerley, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that Congress designed FLSA's whistleblower provision so that
employees need not jeopardize their employment when trying to enforce their rights
under FLSA. See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999). Construing
FLSA too narrowly, the court opined, would impede the very protection Congress sought
to afford employees under the Act. See id. Finally, the court noted that its decision was
in accordance with the other circuits that had considered and applied a broad and
sweeping interpretation of FLSA's whistleblower provision. See id.
159. See Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411 ("It would make little sense to restrict the
whistle[]blower protection to the corporation and not extend it to the agents by which the
corporation must act.").
160. See Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1994).
161. See id. at 1315 ("ERISA broadly prohibits the termination or other adverse
treatment. . . .").
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the whistleblower process.162 As the Ninth Circuit notes, if an employer
can take an adverse employment action against an employee for raising a
problem, then the process of bringing the violation to light is "interrupted
at its start."'16 3 Accordingly, applying a policy interpretation of ERISA's
whistleblower provision yields the broadest protection to whistleblowers
and effectuates the purpose of ERISA's whistleblower provision.
IV. CONCLUSION
As detailed by this Comment, the scope of ERISA's whistleblower
provision has become a point of contention among the circuit courts.
Given the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Edwards, the
inconsistent approaches to ERISA's whistleblower provision remain at
the forefront of ERISA's jurisprudence. Additionally, the ambiguous
language of ERISA's whistleblower provision and the inability of the
circuit courts to interpret this language consistently significantly limits
the protections extended to employees for voicing violations of
ERISA.164 Moreover, the Fourth, Second, and Third Circuit's analyses
of ERISA's whistleblower provision create precarious consequences for
whistleblowers.165
Accordingly, without guidance from the Supreme Court, circuit
courts analyzing the scope of ERISA's whistleblower provision as an
issue of first impression should adopt a broad interpretation, similar to
the Ninth Circuit's, to extend whistleblowers protection and to provide
effective enforcement of ERISA. Of the five circuits to consider the
scope of ERISA's whistleblower provision, the Ninth Circuit's policy
interpretation yields the broadest protection to whistleblowers and allows
for the most effective enforcement of ERISA.166 Because employees are
in the best position to detect illegal or unethical workplace conduct, it is
important to encourage employees to report violations of ERISA.'67
162. See Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411 ("The normal first step in giving information or
testifying in any way that might tempt an employer to discharge one would be to present
the problem first to the responsible managers of the ERISA plan.").
163. Id.
164. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1974).
165. See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d 217, 225 (holding ERISA's
whistleblower provision does not protect an employee's unsolicited internal complaints to
management); Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 329 (noting that ERISA's
whistleblower provision is much broader than that of FLSA); King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc.
337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that ERISA's whistleblower provision merely
encompasses activities that are "legal or administrative").
166. See Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411.
167. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
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Without the assistance of employees, the effectiveness of ERISA is
dramatically diminished.'
Given the risks surrounding the act of whistleblowing and the need
to safeguard the retirement rights of employees, America must protect its
most valuable source for detecting ERISA workplace violations. 169
Interpreting ERISA's whistleblower provision to encompass the activity
of voicing internal workplace complaints is the only way to achieve
effective enforcement of ERISA. With the cries of whistleblowers
sounding faintly in the distance, now is the time to make their whistles
heard.
168. See Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411 ("It would make little sense to restrict the
whistle[]blower protection to the corporation and not extend it to the agents by which the
corporation must act.").
169. See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292.
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